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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Ark. Dairy Coop. Ass'n., Inc v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 573 F.3d 815
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
LAW: Per 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5), the Secretary of Agriculture
(Secretary) establishes formulas to calculate the minimum prices that
dairy handlers (processors, manufacturers, and distributors) must pay
dairy farmers (Producers) for milk. As part of those formulas, the
Secretary sets "make allowances," which represent the costs to
handlers in making certain forms of dairy products.
FACTS: In July 2008, the Secretary promulgated an "Interim
Rule" amending milk marketing orders to increase make allowances,
thus reducing the minimum price paid to the Producers. Several
Producers and producer cooperatives challenged the increases,
principally on the ground that the Secretary had failed to determine
and consider their food and fuel costs, which they maintain was
required by the 2008 amendment to Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act (AMAA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-74. The district court
ruled that the Producers lacked standing for want of a cause of action
and, alternatively, denied their motion for a preliminary injunction.
The Producers appealed, contending they had demonstrated their
entitlement to a preliminary injunction. They further contended they
had demonstrated irreparable harm and that an injunction in their
favor was in line with the public interest in preventing unauthorized
administrative action and direct injury to them.
ANALYSIS: Preliminarily, the court found that the Producers
could bring suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to
challenge the Interim Rule, which directly affected their profits
because make allowances were increased. The Producers were
qualified to bring suit because they were aggrieved, within the
meaning of the APA, by the alleged diminution of their personal
rights secured under the AMAA, the Interim Rule they challenged
constituted final agency action, and they sought non-monetary
injunctive relief. The court then turned to the merits of the
Producers' contention that the Secretary was statutorily required to
determine and consider the Producers' feed and fuel costs in seeking
to change the amount of the make allowance. However, the
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Producers failed to show a likelihood of success in seeking to enjoin
the Interim Rule. Specifically, the Producers were unable to show
prejudice as a result of the Secretary using old or incorrect figures
and agricultural prices, as was alleged. Conversely, the Secretary
complied with his duties by using up-to-date data in compiling
figures and taking official notice of the most recent agricultural
prices available at the time in computing the make allowances.
HOLDING: Although the Producers did have standing to
challenge the interim rule under the APA and the Secretary was
obliged under the AMAA to consider their feed and fuel costs, the
Producers failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. As a
result, this court did not need to balance the remaining factors. The
court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction.
IMPACT: The court used this decision to even out the profit
margins between the handlers and the Producers. Although the
Secretary did increase make allowances -- thereby decreasing the
amount received by the Producers - the Secretary reasoned that this
was necessary in order to help offset the increases in the
manufacturing costs incurred by the handlers. Also, the Secretary
reasoned that the reduced profits collected by Producers could be
recouped through market mechanisms. The make allowances were
the only mechanism through which the handlers could recoup their
costs under the current pricing formula.
Cohen v. United States, 578 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 2009).
LAW: On May 26, 2006, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
issued Notice 2006-50 (Notice). The Notice announced the
discontinuation of the excise tax for phone charges based solely on
transmission time and detailed the refund process for taxes
erroneously collected between February 28, 2003 and August 1,
2006. Under the Notice, individual taxpayers had to request their
refund or credit on their 2006 federal income tax returns. Taxpayers
could either request a "safe harbor" amount, which required no
documentation, or the actual amount of tax they paid, for which the
IRS could demand documentation. It makes clear that taxpayers
cannot seek administrative refunds in any other matter.
FACTS: The Notice gave taxpayers the right not to pay excise
taxes on phone calls for which the charges vary based only on
transmission time, and not with distance. After the Notice, various
lawsuits arose challenging the refund process. The district court
dismissed the cases after concluding that taxpayers (Appellants)
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies for their refund claims
and failed to make valid claims under federal law, including the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702. The district
court also ruled that their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief
were mooted by the IRS's decision to discontinue the tax on time-
based phone charges. On appeal, Appellants asked the Court to
strike down the IRS's refund regime under the Notice as unlawful, or
alternatively, to remand the issue to the district court.
The case also involved the situation of one specific individual,
Cohen. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6532, taxpayers cannot file suit to
recover taxes until six months after filing a valid refund claim with
the IRS unless the Secretary renders a decision within that time
frame. In November 2005, Cohen filed a refund claim for excise
taxes he paid in 2004 and 2005. He received a letter from the IRS,
dated December 20, 2005, stating they had received his claim but had
not resolved it, as they had not completed the research needed to give
him a correct response, and that the IRS would contact him within
forty-five days. Cohen received a second letter from the IRS dated
January 4, 2006, informing him that the IRS was not able to process
his claim because the tax was the subject of current litigation, and
that he would be contacted when the situation was resolved. Cohen
concluded that the January 4, 2006 letter he received from the IRS
communicated the IRS's decision not to voluntarily return his money
and thus triggered his right to sue. On appeal, Cohen contended that
the district court erred by dismissing his refund claim for a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that he filed suit
prematurely.
ANALYSIS: "[T]he IRS unlawfully expropriated billions of
dollars from taxpayers ... and developed a mandatory process as the
sole avenue by which the agency would consider refunding its ill-
gotten gains." Additionally, Appellants were barred from pursuing
their refunds in court by virtue of the fact that they did not exhaust
their administrative remedies under the only available avenue --
Notice 2006-50. Consequently, Appellants sought to challenge these
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procedural obstacles the IRS inserted between individual taxpayers
and their right to file suit to recover unlawfully collected taxes. The
court stated, in no uncertain terms, that the "IRS [could not] avoid
judicial review of that process by simply designating it a policy
statement[,]" and that "[the Notice] constituted a final agency action
that aggrieved taxpayers by hindering their access to court."
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court and remanded
Appellants' APA claims for further consideration.
As for Cohen, contrary to his reasoning, the January 2006 letter
merely communicated that the IRS was not going to take any action
at that point because the tax was currently the subject of litigation.
The IRS did not refuse to accept Cohen's claim. Rather, the letter
informed him as to why his claim had not yet been processed and
invited him to contact the IRS with any questions. Cohen relied on
his own misinterpretation of the letter's meaning. Accordingly,
Cohen's refund claim was deemed premature and the district court
rightly concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
HOLDING: The court reversed the dismissal of Appellants'
APA claims, but affirmed the dismissal of Cohen's refund claim.
IMPACT: This case signals a change in the way revenues are
collected via taxation. The advent of cellular phones has changed the
way Americans communicate, and has thus changed the methods in
which the IRS can tax phone companies. Though the IRS was forced
to return the excess taxes it collected, it is likely that it will develop
new methods to tax Americans on their use of cellular phones on a
new system that coincides with the Notice.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Joseph v. Holder, 579 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009).
LAW: Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), time limits do not apply
to a motion to reopen to:
[A]pply or reapply for asylum or withholding of
deportation based on changed circumstances arising in
the country of nationality or in the country to which
deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is
material and was not available and could not have
been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.
FACTS: At the time of this asylum hearing, Roome Joseph was a
twenty-eight-year-old woman who came to the United States from
Pakistan in 1998 with her parents and two brothers. Her father went
back to Pakistan in 1999, and her mother and brothers returned to
Pakistan in 2005. Joseph married an American man in 2004, whom
she later divorced. Her family strongly disapproved of her marriage,
and her father informed her that he had arranged for her to marry a
Pakistani man upon her return to Pakistan. As a result, Joseph feared
that her family would disown her if she refused, consequently forcing
her to live as a single woman in Pakistan. Joseph went so far as to
submit evidence that Christian women in Pakistan, abandoned by
their families, often face a life of prostitution, violence, and death.
On June 26, 2006, Joseph filed a motion to reopen her asylum
proceedings. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), such motions
"must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final
administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be
reopened." Joseph acknowledged that her motion was untimely, but
was convinced that she could demonstrate "changed circumstances"
that would exempt her from the time requirements. The Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied her motion, but the court granted
Joseph's petition for review and remanded to the BIA because it
failed to consider her argument that her parents' threat of forced
marriage constituted a changed circumstance in Pakistan. On
remand, the BIA again denied her motion to reopen, and Joseph
again petitioned the court for review. Her main contentions were that
the BIA failed to consider her arguments, misconstrued relevant legal
standards, and misinterpreted 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), which
creates the relevant exception for the filing of an untimely motion to
reopen.
ANALYSIS: The regulation on which Joseph's case turned
requires "changed circumstances arising in the country of
nationality." Nowhere does the statute mandate a narrower
requirement, such as a "dramatic change" that the BIA seemed to
require. Rather, the statute only requires (1) that there be changed
circumstances; (2) that the circumstances be material; and (3) that the
evidence showing changed circumstances "was not available and
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could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing."
The plain language of the regulation also does not limit the concept
of "changed circumstances" to some kind of broad social or political
change in the country, such as a new governing party. Joseph
sufficiently displayed a changed circumstance. For example, if she
had returned home to Pakistan, she would have faced several
potential hardships: a would-be suitor who might have abducted her
and forced her to marry in Pakistan, a hostile family that might
physically abuse her, or live in a country in which she would have
faced severe harassment - possibly rising to the level of persecution
to which the authorities would turn a blind eye - as a single woman
with no familial support.
HOLDING: The BIA committed legal error in adopting an
overly narrow interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) that runs
counter to the plain language of the regulation. The Court granted
the petition for review and remanded to the BIA to consider all of
Joseph's arguments about the changed circumstances she would face
in Pakistan.
IMPACT: The Court's decision used a strict interpretation of the
statute to arrive at its decision. Although the previous BIA decisions
seemed to require a dramatic change, this court looked at the statute
on its face and found that Joseph was to encounter hardship if she
were to return to her native country. The decision ensures that
"changed circumstances" will be looked at flexibly, and not as a rigid
concept.
Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2009).
LAW: 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519o(b) provides that in Social Security
matters, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) "will not make
determinations and decisions without a properly signed report" and
"will not use an unsigned or improperly signed consultative
examination report to make the determinations or decisions." Also,
when a "properly signed consultative examination report" is required
"to make these determinations or decisions," the ALJ must obtain
said report(s).
FACTS: Lotresia Terry applied for disability insurance benefits
(DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI), asserting that she was
unable to work because she suffered from a rash of medical ailments,
including depression, fibromyalgia, hypertension, pelvic floor
disorder, hematuria (blood in her urine), and severe back pain
following spinal fusion surgery. After her claim was administratively
denied, an ALJ reviewed her claim and concluded that Terry's
impairments did not render her disabled. The ALJ reasoned that
although the limitations prevented her from returning to her previous
job as a certified nurse's assistant, Terry still retained the capacity to
perform simple, unskilled work at the sedentary exertional level with
the option to stand for one to two minutes every one-half hour. Terry
then asked the Social Security Appeals Council to reconsider the
ALJ's determination in light of new evidence that documented her
treatment for depression during the spring of 2007. The Appeals
Council denied the request. The district court held that the ALJ's
decision was supported by substantial evidence. Terry appealed.
ANALYSIS: This case turned on an unsigned, undated residual
functional capacity (RFC) form from the state agency which
concluded that Terry could perform work at the sedentary level. The
RFC form stated that Terry "could occasionally lift ten pounds,
frequently lift less than ten pounds, stand or walk at least two hours
in an eight-hour workday, and sit for six hours in an eight-hour
workday." However, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519o(b) provides that an
unsigned examination report may not be used to deny benefits. Once
the unsigned report was thrown out, no other evidence supported the
ALJ's conclusion that Terry could perform sedentary work, as none
of the other documents stated that she was capable of performing
such work. Second, the AL's opinion failed to even mention
Terry's pelvic floor and urinary disorders - impairments that must be
considered in determining whether or not an applicant is disabled.
The court completely ignored the reasoning from Villano v. Astrue,
556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009), which found that ALJs must
consider the combined effects of all of the claimant's impairments,
even those that would not be considered severe in isolation. Lastly,
the ALJ failed to support his conclusion that Terry's testimony was
not credible. The ALJ repeatedly mischaracterized the record by
identifying purported "inconsistencies" in Terry's testimony. The
court, relying on Ribaudo v. Barnhardt, 458 F.3d 580, 584-85 (7th
Cir. 2002), held that the AL's adverse credibility determination was
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not supported by the record and that, on remand, the agency must
reassess Terry's credibility in light of all evidence presented.
HOLDING: Because the ALJ relied on an unsigned medical
report that should have been excluded from the record, failed to
consider all of Terry's impairments, and erroneously found her not
credible, the court remanded the case to the agency.
IMPACT: The initial ALJ who ruled against Terry, along with
the district court, failed to follow the letter and spirit of the law. The
black letter law states that one may not rely on unsigned medical
reports in rulings. However, the report that was relied upon most
heavily in ruling against Terry was one that was unsigned.
Fortunately for Terry, she appealed the decision and won.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT
BNSF Ry. Co. v. O'Dea, 572 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2009).
LAW: Section 2-4-702(2)(a) of the Montana Code declares that a
petition for review "must be filed in the [state] district court for the
county where the petitioner resides or has the petitioner's principal
place of business or where the agency maintains its principal office."
FACTS: Matt O'Dea, a citizen of Montana, applied to and was
extended a conditional offer of employment for the position of
Conductor Trainee by BNSF Railway Company, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. However,
after an individualized medical assessment, BNSF disqualified
O'Dea from further consideration for the position. O'Dea
subsequently filed a complaint of discrimination with the Montana
Department of Labor and Industry, Employment Relations Division,
alleging that BNSF discriminated against him because of the
perceived disability of obesity. O'Dea claimed that the alleged
discrimination violated the Montana Human Rights Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. A hearing examiner granted O'Dea's motion for
summary ruling on liability and issued a final decision awarding him
damages and other relief. The Montana Human Rights Commission
affirmed that decision. After BNSF filed a federal action based upon
diversity jurisdiction, O'Dea filed a motion to dismiss the action,
arguing that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because federal courts do not have diversity jurisdiction over appeals
from state agencies. The district court agreed, dismissing the action.
This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS: The court relied heavily upon its decision in
Shamrock Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 120 F.3d 196 (9th Cir.
1997) in formulating its opinion. In Shamrock, this court held that
federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review decisions of
Montana Administrative agencies where the review is of an on-the-
record rather than de novo nature. In the instant case, the court held
that a state cannot confer rights upon private parties and require that
litigation between those parties be confined to the courts of the state
itself. Additionally, the court held that in determining jurisdiction,
the district courts of the United States must look to the sources of
their power - Article III of the United States Constitution and
Congressional statutory grants of jurisdiction - and not to the acts of
state legislatures. Simply put, the states have no power directly to
enlarge or contract federal jurisdiction.
HOLDING: Even though the case involved the on-the-record
review of a Montana administrative agency decision, the district
court still retained diversity jurisdiction.
IMPACT: The decision effectively terminated Shamrock's
influence, as the court held that the district court did have subject
matter jurisdiction to hear BNSF's review action. The decision of the
court bestowed additional powers on the federal court system to
decide matters of diversity jurisdiction.
Pub. Citizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 573 F.3d 916 (9th
Cir. 2009).
LAW: Under 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a), when licensing nuclear
facilities, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) is
"charged with ensuring that the operation of those facilities is 'in
accord with the common defense and security and will provide
adequate protection to the health and safety of the public."'
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FACTS: Public Citizen (Petitioners) challenge the
Commission's modification of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) rule.
Petitioners claim the Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and
contrary to law by refusing to include the threat of air attacks in the
final revised DBT rule. Petitioners further claim that that the
Commission violated the National Environmental Policy Act by not
considering the risk of an airborne terrorist attack in its
Environmental Assessment (EA), and that this risk created a
potentially significant impact on the environment, creating the need
for a full Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
ANALYSIS: First, the Commission did not depart from an
established standard in the DBT rule, but instead elaborated on its
interpretation of the rule. Specifically, the Commission determined
that the requirements of the DBT rule could exceed the requirements
of adequate protection where private forces could reasonably defend
against the threat. Citing Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824
F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the court found that in determining
"adequate protection," the Commission should not rely strictly on
cost. Rather, it should consider other factors including the nature and
extent of the risks involved. Additionally, "adequate protection"
does not mean "absolute protection," as the standard allows some
level of actual risk. Applying this standard, it was determined that
the air-based threats were beyond the scope of the DBT rule and that
the Commission was under no obligation to consider passive
protective measures. In support of their determination, the
Commission proved "adequate protection" by showing that there was
(1) active protection against airborne threats provided by other
Federal agencies; and (2) there were existing mitigative measures
limiting the effects of an aircraft strike. Moreover, because
Petitioners identified no effect of the revised DBT rule that could
potentially cause "significant degradation of some human
environmental factor," no EIS was necessary.
HOLDING: The petition was denied, as the Court held that (1)
the Commission did not act arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to
include the threat of air attacks in the revised rule; (2) the
Commission did not act contrary to law in finding that protection
requirements were satisfied without incorporating passive protective
measures against air-based attacks; and (3) the Commission did not
abuse its discretion by not considering the risk of airborne terrorist
attacks in its environmental assessment.
IMPACT: The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks led to a tightening of security measures spanning everywhere
from courthouses to nuclear power plants. Although the Petitioners'
argument drew a dissenting opinion questioning why the
Commission excluded reports that found that there were insufficient
protective methods employed - leaving nuclear plants open to
potential attacks - the majority found that the Commission did
provide "adequate protection" against air strikes. In the wake of
September 11,, national security has become a paramount concern
and thus there almost certainly will be future challenges (and
probably amendments) to the DBT Rule in the near future.
Renee v. Duncan, 573 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2009).
LAW: 34 C.F.R. § 200.56, enacted by the United States
Secretary of Education on December 2, 2002, states in its most
pertinent parts that a teacher can be "highly qualified" under the No
Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) if the teacher "[i]s participating in an
alternative route to certification program," and "demonstrates
satisfactory progress toward full certification as prescribed by the
State." Alternative route programs are alternatives to the traditional
college-based teacher education program routes for obtaining teacher
certification.
FACTS: Under 20 U.S.C. § 6301, otherwise known as the
NCLB, the overarching goal is "to ensure that all children have a fair,
equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education
and reach, at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic
achievement standards and state academic assessments." Congress
provided that by the end of the 2005-2006 academic year, only highly
qualified teachers would instruct core academic classes in states
receiving the NCLB funding. Appellants - several California public
school students and their parents, joined by two California
community organizations - allege that they have been harmed
because California school districts have hired thousands of
"alternative route" participants, allowed these teachers to be
concentrated in low-income and minority areas, and treated the
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teachers as highly qualified for reporting and parental notification
purposes. In August 2007, Appellants brought an Administrative
Procedure Act challenge in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California against the United States Department
of Education and Secretary of Education (collectively, the Secretary),
alleging that 34 C.F.R. § 200.56 (Regulation) is inconsistent with
NCLB, and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Both parties
moved for summary judgment and, on June 17, 2008, the district
court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the
Secretary. A timely appeal followed.
ANALYSIS: Appellants argued that a declaration asserting that
the alternative route regulation was "unlawful and void," would
likely cause California to cease treating alternative route participants
as highly qualified. However, per Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154
(1997), the meaning of "full certification" is a matter of state law. As
a result, California could still determine that teachers participating in
alternative routes to certification were highly qualified.
Consequently, redressability turned on whether, absent the
Regulation, California would consider teachers participating in
alternative routes to be highly qualified. The court found that there
was no evidence that the revocation of the Regulation would have a
coercive effect upon California. As a result, Appellants failed to
demonstrate that it was likely that the injury they complained of
would be redressed by a decision in their favor.
HOLDING: The court held that they need not decide the issue of
injury in fact because they concluded that the Appellants failed to
show redressability. As a result, the Appellants lacked standing to
challenge the regulation. The court vacated the district court's order
for lack of jurisdiction.
IMPACT: This decision turned on redressability. Following the
decision in Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864 (9th Cir.
2004), the court found that "[a] plaintiff meets the redressability test
if it is 'likely' - not certain - 'that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision."' Here, the Appellants were unable to prove that
declaring the Regulation invalid would "likely" cause California to
stop hiring alternative route participants. Though the Appellants'
argument did raise valid questions regarding the state of public
education in California, especially in the inner cities, their case failed
at step one, as they could not establish standing to challenge the
Regulation.
River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 574 F.3d 723 (9th Cir.
2009).
LAW: 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) states that courts can only hold
unlawful and set aside agency actions, findings, and decisions if they
are found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law."
FACTS: River Runners for Wilderness, Rock the Earth,
Wilderness Watch, and Living Rivers (Plaintiffs) brought an action
against the National Park Service (Park Service) and various
individual defendants (Defendants), seeking to set aside a decision of
the Park Service that adopted and approved the 2006 Colorado River
Management Plan (CRMP), which approved continued use of
motorized rafts, generators, and helicopters in the Colorado River
Corridor of Grand Canyon National Park. Plaintiffs contended that
such motorized activities impaired the wilderness character of the
Corridor and that the Park Service's decision violated its
management policies and various federal statutes. Specifically,
Plaintiffs asserted that the 2006 CRMP was not only unlawful, but
also arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA) because it violated (1) the Park Service's own policies;
(2) the National Park Service Concessions Management and
Improvement Act (Concessions Act); (3) the National Park Service
Organic Act (Organic Act); and (4) the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA). The United States District Court for the District
of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
Plaintiffs appealed.
ANALYSIS: First, the court addressed Plaintiffs' claim that the
Park Service breached its legal duty by authorizing the continued use
of motorized activities in the 2006 CRMP. The Plaintiffs alleged that
the 2001 Park Service Management Policies (2001 Policies) were
binding because they were written in a mandatory language, were
mentioned in the Federal Register, and were found binding in South
Utah Wilderness Alliance v. National Park Service, 387 F. Supp. 2d
Fall 2009 Legal Summaries
788 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 29-2
1178 (D. Utah 2005). However, the court found that the 2001
Policies did not prescribe substantive rules and were not promulgated
in conformance with the procedures of the APA. As a result, the
court did not set aside the 2006 CRMP because it "failed" to comply
with portions of the 2001 Policies requiring the Park Service to treat
the Colorado River Corridor as "wilderness" or "potential
wilderness," as Plaintiffs alleged.
Second, the court addressed Plaintiffs' allegation that the 2006
CRMP was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to comply with
the requirements of the Concessions Act - governing the granting of
commercial concessions within the National Park System. Plaintiffs
specifically claimed that the Park Service failed to determine the
types and levels of motorized uses, authorized by the CRP, that
were actually necessary and appropriate for public use. However, the
court found that the Park Service arrived at its conclusion after
considering various alternatives and weighing a significant number of
variables. Further, the Park Service even chose an alternative that
reduced motorized uses from previous levels. In addition, the court
found that the Park Service effectively determined the type and level
of traffic on the river that was "necessary and appropriate," including
the type and level of motorized uses.
Third, the Plaintiffs contended that the 2006 CRMP negated the
goals and intents of the Organic Act, including providing that the
Park Service promote and regulate the use of national parks so that
present and future generations can enjoy them. Plaintiffs alleged that
the CRMP was arbitrary and capricious because it allowed
commercial boaters to use the river at levels that actually interfered
with free access by the public and because the CRMP wrongfully
concluded that motorized uses did not impair the natural soundscape
of the Park. The court dismissed Plaintiffs' arguments by pointing
out that the allocation of river time between commercial and non-
commercial user days changed from 66.5% commercial and 33.5%
non-commercial under the 1989 CRMP, to 50.4% commercial and
49.6% non-commercial under the 2006 CRMP. The 2006 CRMP
even reduced the number of launches and passengers for commercial
users, while nearly doubling both categories for non-commercial
users. Further, the 2006 CRMP significantly revised the system for
private boaters to obtain permits by establishing a lottery system
weighted to favor those who have not received a permit in previous
years. Additionally, the court found unpersuasive Plaintiffs'
arguments that motorized uses in the Corridor impaired the natural
soundscape of the Park. The Park Service relied on studies
conducted by noise experts in 1993 and 2003 that included field
acoustic measurements and sounds from motorized and non-
motorized raft trips, amongst other sounds. Given the evidence
presented, the court concluded that motorized uses did not impair the
soundscape of the Park in violation of the Organic Act.
Last, Plaintiffs claimed that the 2006 CRMP was arbitrary and
capricious because it failed to comply with NEPA. Under NEPA,
federal agencies must prepare detailed environmental impact
statements for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c).
Plaintiffs' specific allegation was that the Park Service failed to take
a close look at cumulative sound impact and failed to use high quality
information or accurate scientific analysis. The court disagreed with
Plaintiffs' allegation and found that the Park Service took a hard look
at the cumulative impact of noise on the river environment, including
noise from river traffic, helicopters, and aircraft overflights.
HOLDING: The Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the high threshold
required to set aside federal agency actions under the APA. As a
result, the court granted the summary judgment motion of Defendants
and therefore, denied the summary judgment motions of the
Plaintiffs.
IMPACT: The Grand Canyon is one of America's greatest
natural treasures. However, environmental degradation has
destroyed many of the world's great natural parks and wonders. As a
result, the Plaintiffs strove to eliminate motorized boats, planes, and
generators from being used in this Corridor of the Grand Canyon in
order to preserve its natural state and beauty. However, the court
disagreed with the Plaintiffs' arguments. The decision strikes a
healthy balance, as it: (1) ensures that the elderly, physically
disabled, or even everyday people, can enjoy the beauty and splendor
of the Grand Canyon on commercial tours via motorized boats,
planes, or rafts; (2) increases the opportunity for outdoor aficionados
to camp, raft, hike, and explore the Canyon on their own; and (3)
enforces current environmental regulations and laws to ensure that
the Canyon will not be destroyed by pollution, effluents, or
environmental degradation.
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Valentine v. Comm'r Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685 (9th Cir.
2009).
LAW: 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) lays out a sequential,
five-step evaluation process to determine disability.
If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a
step, we make our determination or decision and we do
not go on to the next step. If we cannot find that you
are disabled or not disabled at a step, we go on to the
next step. Before we go from step three to step four,
we assess your residual functional capacity.
The residual functional capacity assessment is used at both steps
four and five. The five steps of the process are as follows: (i) at step
one, "we consider your work activity, if any. If you are doing
substantial gainful activity, we will find that you are not disabled."
(ii) at step two, the medical severity of the individual's impairment is
considered and if the individual does not have a severe, medically
determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the duration
requirement in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509, or a combination of
impairments that are severe and meet the duration requirement, he
will be found "not disabled;" (iii) at step three, "we also consider the
medical severity of your impairment(s). If you have an
impairment(s) that meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1
of this subpart and meets the duration requirement, we will find that
you are disabled;" (iv) At step four, "we consider our assessment of
your residual functional capacity and your past relevant work. If you
can still do your past relevant work, we will find that you are not
disabled;" and (v) at step five, the final step, we will examine our
assessment of your residual functional capacity along with your age,
education, and work experience "to see if you can make an
adjustment to other work. If you can make an adjustment to other
work, we will find that you are not disabled. If you cannot make an
adjustment to other work, we will find that you are disabled."
FACTS: Jerry Valentine filed an application with the Social
Security Administration (SSA) for Social Security disability
insurance benefits in March 2005. Valentine alleged disability
beginning in 2004. A former member of the Navy, Valentine
suffered a combat head injury in Vietnam in 1969. Since the injury,
Valentine held several jobs before retiring in March 2004. Valentine
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complained of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and a
combination of depression and sleep deprivation, along
with degenerative joint disease in his right shoulder and left knee.
The PTSD resulted from Valentine's head injury in Vietnam, but it
appeared to have worsened significantly in the wake his brother's
death from a head injury in the summer of 2000. Valentine received
treatment for the PTSD and for sleep disturbance and persistent
nightmares at a Veterans Administration Medical Center from
September 2000 through March 2006. In 2001, Valentine began
sleep therapy treatment with Dr. Lynn M. Van Male. At the time,
Valentine reported that he got a good night's sleep about three days a
week. Valentine's performance at work was erratic, as he received
several marginal performance ratings on his annual job review in
February 2002. As a result, Dr. Van Male sent Valentine to undergo
a neuropsychological assessment. The overall results indicated
normal cognitive abilities. However, other tests indicated impaired
performance with respect to attention, working memory, and
complex psychomotor function. All the while, Valentine tried to
increase his disability rating, which then stood at 30%, from the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). In a letter to the VA written in
May 2002, Dr. Van Male stated that while Valentine was able to hold
down his job, she worried about his ability to maintain employment
"given his current rate of functional decline." The VA raised his
disability rating to 70%. Though his difficulties persisted during
2003, Valentine's performance review in January 2003 was positive;
his ratings being in the "acceptable" to "commendable" range. He
received positive reviews in February from his supervisor, who
praised Valentine's attitude and noted improvement in his work
product. After his retirement, Valentine's condition continued to
improve as he exercised and took up projects to keep busy. He even
stopped regular visits with Dr. Van Male in November 2004.
Valentine then requested another increase in his disability rating from
the VA. Dr. Leslie Carter interviewed him in October 2004 and
found that Valentine's nightmares and sleep deprivation were
"extremely disabling." Dr. Carter, however, was under the
impression that Valentine had ceased working because he was about
to be fired. Initially, the VA did not act, despite Dr. Carter's report.
After Dr. Van Male sent further letters in 2005 and 2006, the VA
ultimately raised Valentine's disability rating to 100%. In addition to
the PTSD, Valentine sustained two physical injuries in 2005: torn
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cartilage in his shoulder and damage to his left knee. He underwent
surgery for both injuries. In September 2005, two months before
surgery on his knee, Valentine took a physical examination, which
did not suggest any significant physical impairment. Several
psychologists, including Dr. Peter LeBray, reviewed Valentine's
medical record on behalf of the SSA. The ALJ considered this
evidence, along with the rest of Valentine's file, at a hearing in
March 2006. Ultimately, the ALJ decided that Valentine was not
disabled, denying him the benefits requested. The Appeals Council
declined review. In response, Valentine filed a civil action in the
district court to obtain judicial review of the agency's decision. The
district court affirmed the denial of benefits. Valentine appealed.
ANALYSIS: Valentine's first objection concerned the residual
functional capacity determination (RFC) made by the ALJ. The RFC
is a summary of what the claimant is capable of doing: for example,
how much weight the claimant can lift. In the RFC, the ALJ
concluded that Valentine possessed the residual functional capacity
"to perform a limited range of medium exertion work." Valentine
specifically contended that the ALJ did not take account of all his
limitations in fashioning the RFC. However, the court found that the
limitations and observations made by Doctors LeBray and Storzbach
appeared almost verbatim in the actual RFC. Thus, it could not be
said that the ALJ ignored evidence of Valentine's impairments when
she compiled his RFC.
Second, Valentine argued that the ALJ improperly rejected other
evidence of the extent of his impairments. Valentine claims that the
ALJ should not have rejected Dr. Van Male's testimony, his own
testimony, and his wife's testimony. However, the court rejected Dr.
Van Male's testimony because it was contradictory. Dr. Van Male
had reported that Valentine was unemployable, but, Dr. Van Male's
own "treatment progress reports" reported that Valentine
demonstrated improved functioning at work and had received
encouraging comments from company officials. The court also
rejected the testimonies of Valentine and his wife because the ALJ
provided clear and convincing evidence that served to contradict
Valentine's physical impairment complaint. Specifically, the ALJ
noted that Valentine "'demonstrated better abilities than he
acknowledged in his written statements and testimony' and that his
'non-work activities... [were] inconsistent with the degree of
impairment he allege[d]."' The ALJ went so far as to note the fact
that Valentine exercised and undertook several community activities
-- including gardening with his wife - which proved that he was not
disabled.
Lastly, Valentine contends that the ALJ should have accepted the
VA's rating declaring he was 100% disabled. The ALJ found that
the VA's determination "was not based on a comprehensive
evaluation of the evidence available." In other words, the ALJ
highlighted the fact that the VA rested on an opinion that the ALJ
rejected. Additionally, the ALJ received additional evidence that
undermined the evidence that the VA actually had. The Court
concluded that the acquisition of new evidence was a valid reason for
disregarding the VA's disability rating.
HOLDING: Judgment of the district court was affirmed.
IMPACT: The ALJ was able to wade through the numerous facts
and circumstances and separate the valid medical reports from the
false ones in order to come to a just decision. Also, the ALJ
meticulously went through the five-step process to correctly
determine that Valentine was not disabled. Meticulous attention to
detail in these cases will ensure that those who truly deserve
disability benefits will receive them, while keeping those who do not
deserve them from unjust enrichment.
SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Res. Control
Bd., 199 P.3d 1142 (Cal. 2009).
LAW: California Government Code section 11430.30, also
known as California's Administrative Procedure Act (Act), only
requires the internal separation of prosecutorial and advisory
functions on a strict case-by-case basis. In other words, the Act does
not prohibit an agency employee who acts in a prosecutorial capacity
in one case from concurrently acting in an advisory role in an
unrelated case.
FACTS: The Morongo Band of Mission Indians (Morongo
Band), a federally recognized California Indian tribe, is the current
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holder of a license to divert water, for irrigation purposes, from
springs arising in Millard Canyon in Riverside County. In April
2003, the State Water Resources Control Board (Board) issued a
notice of proposed revocation of that license on the grounds that the
Morongo Band, or prior holders of the license, failed to beneficially
utilize the water for an extended period and had violated license
terms by using the water for unauthorized purposes. The Morongo
Band then requested a hearing to contest the proposed license
revocation. The Board subsequently issued a notice of public
hearing, which identified staff counsel Samantha Olson as a member
of the enforcement team prosecuting the case. Olson was not only
acting in a prosecutorial capacity as a member of the enforcement
team, but was also acting in an advisory capacity as a member of the
hearing team in a separate, unrelated matter before the Board. After
considering the materials submitted by the parties, the trial court
granted the petition for writ of mandate compelling Olson's
disqualification. The Board appealed, and the court of appeal
affirmed the trial court's judgment granting the writ. The court
granted the Board's petition for review.
ANALYSIS: The Morongo Band argues that that when the
agency attorney (Olson) concurrently advised the adjudicator in a
separate, albeit unrelated matter, the risk that the agency adjudicator
would be biased in favor of the prosecuting agency attorney was of a
magnitude sufficient to overcome the presumption of impartiality.
However, the Morongo Band presented no evidence that the Board,
or any of its members, was actually prejudiced against it. The court
relied heavily upon Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board., 40 Cal. 4th 16 (2006).
For example, the court in Alcoholic went on to highlight that the Act
specifically holds that the agency head is free to speak with anyone in
the agency and to solicit and receive advice from whomever he or she
pleases, except for the personnel who served as adversaries in a
specific case. In the instant case, the court specifically singled out
two reasons to rule against the court of appeals decision: (1) there
was no evidence that Olson, or any other agency staff attorney, ever
acted in both advisory and prosecutorial capacities in this or any
other single adjudicative proceeding; and (2) there was no evidence
that the Board ever regarded Olson as its sole or primary legal
adviser. Specifically, the undisputed evidence showed that Olson
advised the Board regarding only one matter - one unrelated to the
Morongo Band's license revocation proceeding - and that she was
just one of a group of staff attorneys from which the Board could
obtain legal advice.
HOLDING: It did not violate license holder's right to due
process for the prosecuting agency attorney to simultaneously serve
as an advisor to the Board on an unrelated matter. The decision
reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment.
IMPACT: The Supreme Court of California's decision
effectively overruled the decision in Quintero v. City of Santa Ana,
114 Cal. App. 4th 819 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The Quintero court held
that the internal separation of functions on a case-by-case basis was
insufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements for due process
of law, and that an administrative agency's internal separation of
functions must be complete not only as to each individual case, but as
to all cases, related or unrelated, that are pending before the agency at
any given point in time. In this case, the court was able to
differentiate the specific circumstances to find that there was no risk
of bias present. The court made it clear that the presumption of
impartiality could only be overcome by presenting specific evidence
demonstrating actual bias or a particular combination of
circumstances creating an unacceptable risk of bias.
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